Brucestan Jordan v. Edmond Cicchi by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2011 
Brucestan Jordan v. Edmond Cicchi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Brucestan Jordan v. Edmond Cicchi" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1223. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1223 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2386 
 ___________ 
 
 BRUCESTAN T. JORDAN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
EDMOND C. CICCHI; COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX; MIDDLESEX COUNTY; 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY ADULT CORRECTION CENTER; 
NJ DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS; INSERVCO INSURANCE SERVICES 
INCORPORATED;PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY; WESTPORT INSURANCE CORPORATION; CASEY GROUSER 
            
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-08-cv-06088) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 10, 2011 
 
 Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed May 20, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Brucestan T. Jordan appeals from the orders of the United States 
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District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his motion to reopen to file a second 
amended complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration of that order.  We will 
affirm the Court’s orders in part, and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, and because 
the District Court=s opinions set forth the allegations of the complaint and the relevant 
details of the litigation, we will not provide a detailed account.  In 2008, Jordan initiated 
his lawsuit against the defendants concerning an incident while he was incarcerated at the 
Middlesex County Adult Correctional Center.
1
  He amended the complaint several times 
during the course of proceedings.  Chief among the allegations was his statement that the 
prison prohibited contact between him and his family during a visit that was noticed as a 
contact visit.  After the visit ended, unidentified correctional officers ordered Jordan to 
submit to a visual body cavity strip search.  When Jordan refused, he was forced to 
comply when officers removed his clothing, kicked him to the floor, and stomped on his 
upper back.  Jordan alleged that the search was performed in a harassing manner and 
caused injuries to his back and shoulder.  Jordan then received a false disciplinary charge 
and was placed in “lockup” for seven days, which interfered with his preparation for a 
scheduled oral argument in another court case.  Jordan asserted multiple grounds for 
liability and sought assorted relief including damages of more than $70 million.  The 
Middlesex County defendants filed an answer. 
                                                 
 
1
 Jordan is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Miami, 
Florida. 
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 Jordan was granted in forma pauperis status in District Court.  On June 18, 2009, 
the District Court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Concerning liability under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, the District Court found that no facts were alleged that would suggest personal 
involvement or policymaking by Warden Cicchi or the County of Middlesex.  The 
District Court dismissed these claims without prejudice.  The District Court dismissed 
with prejudice the claims against the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the 
Middlesex County Corrections Center, stating that the Department was entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that neither the Department nor the Corrections 
Center are “persons” amenable to suit under section 1983.  The District Court also 
dismissed with prejudice Jordan’s First Amendment access to courts claim, noting the 
failure to name any defendant involved in the claim, and concluding that Jordan’s 
allegations regarding a seven-day lack of access to the prison law library did not 
demonstrate any actual injury to his oral argument that took place more than one month 
later.  In addition, the District Court dismissed without prejudice the claims against 
certain insurance companies and a claims representative.  The District Court concluded 
that Jordan’s allegations concerning the denial of his claim for compensation for the 
incidents described in the complaint were insufficient to state claims of violations of 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, as there were no allegations suggesting any discriminatory 
animus.  The District Court granted Jordan leave to file a motion to reopen with a 
proposed amended complaint. 
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 Jordan filed a motion to reopen with a proposed amended complaint, in which he 
re-alleged facts concerning the strip search and denial of administrative compensation 
claims and asserted violations of the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and 
Fourteenth Amendment.  He also asserted violations of assorted federal laws, including 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, the False Claims Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, the White Slave Traffic Act, and the Civil RICO Act.  Newly-named defendants 
included an identified corrections officer, who allegedly directed unknown officers to 
perform the strip search and who authored the resulting disciplinary report for Jordan’s 
refusal to submit to a search.  Other new defendants included the State of New Jersey, the 
County of Middlesex, and the County’s Board of Chosen Freeholders, whose relationship 
to the action was alleged to have stemmed from their roles as supervisors and employers.  
The county defendants filed their opposition to the motion. 
 On March 9, 2010, the District Court denied the motion to reopen and denied 
leave to file an amended complaint.  The District Court concluded that the proposed 
second amended complaint failed to cure the deficiencies noted regarding the claims 
previously dismissed under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The District Court also concluded 
that Jordan’s allegations failed to state constitutional violations asserted under the Fourth 
Amendment (concerning unreasonable searches), Eighth Amendment (concerning cruel 
and unusual punishment), and Fourteenth Amendment (concerning due process and equal 
protection).  Further, the District Court concluded that Jordan’s complaint failed to allege 
facts suggesting a basis for the claims under the various federal statutes.  Accordingly, 
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the District Court denied Jordan’s motion to reopen and denied all pending motions.  By 
order entered April 20, 2010, the District Court denied Jordan’s timely motion for 
reconsideration.  Jordan appeals.  We have jurisdiction to consider both the order denying 
the motion to reopen and the order denying the motion for reconsideration.  
28 U.S.C.§ 1291; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). 
 At the outset, we note that Jordan’s appeal is limited to the District Court’s 
decision concerning his claims relating to the unlawful strip search and use of excessive 
force (alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and under 
sections 1983, 1985, and 1986), along with his First Amendment “access to courts” claim 
and his claim under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.  The other issues are 
waived, as they are not argued in Jordan’s opening brief.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.1993); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). 
 Several of the issues on appeal require little discussion.  Upon consideration of the 
record, for essentially the same reasons as those stated by the District Court in its 
opinions, we will affirm the District Court’s disposition of the claims under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act (argued by Jordan as a claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause), the First Amendment,
2
 and under sections 1985 and 1986.  We agree that Jordan 
                                                 
 
2
 Regarding his “access to courts” claim, Jordan contests only the District Court’s 
finding that the dismissal of his complaint counts as his third “strike” for purposes of 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which would subject him to the “imminent danger” requirement 
before being allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in future actions.  Jordan notes in his 
reply brief that he does not have three strikes in light of pending appeals of the cases 
relied upon by the District Court in assessing his strikes.  Indeed, the fact of this current 
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has failed to state a claim on these grounds. 
 Next, we turn to Jordan’s claims relating to the strip search incident.  Regarding 
his due process claim, Jordan argues, inter alia, that he was denied a protected liberty 
interest in being able to shake hands, embrace, and kiss his visitors at the start and 
conclusion of a visit, pursuant to the policy at N.J.D.O.C. 10A:18-6.16(d).  Paragraph 20 
of Jordan’s proposed amended complaint stated that the change in his contact visit to a 
non-contact visit was an undisclosed, unwritten county policy.  He also stated that the 
change in policy was implemented in his case by unidentified correctional staff, who 
informed Jordan that if any contact occurred, the visit would come to an end.  Jordan thus 
argues that he stated a claim of a due process violation for a change in the visitation 
policy without proper notice, and that the District Court erred in its disposition of this 
claim with respect to defendants Cicchi and County of Middlesex. 
 Concerning the County of Middlesex, it appears from Jordan’s allegations that it 
was named as a defendant as Cicchi’s employer.  To the extent that Jordan asserted that 
the deprivation of a contact visit in his case was pursuant to an unwritten internal custom, 
in order to establish the county’s liability under section 1983, Jordan would have to show 
that the custom is so well-settled and permanent as to constitute law.  See Watson v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
appeal validates Jordan’s position.  A dismissal does not qualify as a “strike” for 
§ 1915(g) purposes until a litigant has exhausted or waived his or her appeals.  See 
Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999); 
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996).  The District Court 
prematurely assessed Jordan with a third strike, without accounting for the possibility that 
the dismissed case might be reinstated on appeal.  See Adepegba, 103 F.3d at 387. 
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Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2007).   Jordan did not allege any facts in 
his proposed amended complaint beyond his single incident that would suggest a well-
settled custom of changing contact visits into non-contact visits.  See id. at 157. 
 As for defendant Cicchi, to the extent that he was sued simply because of his role 
as the warden, the claim fails.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“defendant in a civil rights action must have a personal involvement in the alleged 
wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”).  
Jordan alleged that Cicchi was responsible for promulgating or enforcing a change of 
policy from contact visits to no-contact visits.  Jordan provides no allegations other than 
the incident against him to establish that there was any change in policy; the allegation of 
this one-time incident is insufficient to establish a change in policy, and the due process 
claim against Cicchi fails.  See Watson, 478 F.3d at 155-56. 
 We now consider Jordan’s Fourth Amendment argument that the strip search was 
unreasonable.  Jordan contended that the written policy provided for a strip search to be 
performed after a contact visit, and there was no probable cause for a strip search in his 
case because he was denied a contact visit with his family.  We are troubled somewhat by 
the District Court’s analysis of this claim.  The District Court began with Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520 (1979), which discussed body cavity searches following a contact visit from 
a person outside the institution and the security interest of preventing the smuggling of 
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contraband into the facility.
3
  Here, however, Jordan alleged in his proposed amended 
complaint that the visit in question was not a contact visit.  Specifically, he alleged that 
corrections officers instructed him and his family at the beginning of the visit that no 
contact would be allowed, and that he and his family sat at a table equipped with a barrier 
to prevent any contact.  Jordan also alleged that the visit was conducted under constant 
video surveillance by guards, thereby preventing any possible contact to go undetected.  
Despite these allegations, and instead of accepting as true the factual allegations in the 
complaint in evaluating the complaint under section 1915(e), see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 
63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996), the District Court stated that Jordan’s description of the visit as a 
non-contact visit was merely “self-serving.” Instead, the District Court found that the 
visit was “something of a hybrid,” noting that the party sat together at a table in a visiting 
room, “presumabl[y] used by other prisoners and their visitors.”  (District Court Mar. 9, 
2010 Opinion at 13.)  Thus, the District Court concluded that the body cavity search was 
not unreasonable under the circumstances, but it appears that it reached that conclusion 
by “presuming” that Jordan had opportunities for contact with other prisoners and visitors 
during the visit.  On this record, we cannot conclude that Jordan has made bare assertions 
of entitlement to relief without any factual contentions in support of his Fourth 
Amendment claim.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
                                                 
 
3
 This Court recently revisited Bell and concluded that the security interest was as 
strong at the time of arrestee intake as after contact visits.  See Florence v. Board of 
Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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 Lastly, we consider Jordan’s allegations of excessive force, which Jordan framed 
as a separate constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment.  The District Court 
concluded that the allegations relating to the strip search must be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment, stating that the Fourth Amendment is the explicit source for the 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches, and thus, Jordan did not state a 
claim under the Eighth Amendment.
4
  An analysis of an excessive force claim may 
proceed under either the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizures of the person), or the 
Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishments), the Eighth Amendment being the 
primary source of protection after an individual’s conviction.  See Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).  In concluding that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
Jordan’s allegations, the District Court cited Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 238 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 2004), a case that involved a search and seizure of individuals outside of a prison 
context.  We note that the appellees state in their brief that Jordan was a pretrial detainee 
at the time of the events.  Jordan does not identify himself in that manner in the amended 
complaint, and the District Court’s opinion does not contain a finding or description of 
Jordan’s inmate status at the time of the incident.5  In any event, in evaluating Jordan’s 
allegations, the District Court found that a reasonable amount of force was used during 
                                                 
4
 It appears that the District Court may have believed that Jordan’s allegations of 
excessive force used during the strip search were subsumed within his claim that the 
search itself was unreasonable, but it is unclear from the District Court’s opinion why it 
reached that determination. 
5
 In its June 18, 2009 opinion, the District Court refers to Jordan as a “prisoner,” 
rather than a “detainee.” 
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the search in light of Jordan’s failure to comply to the strip search.6  The District Court 
noted Jordan’s allegations of having his clothing removed and being compelled to make 
his body parts available for visual inspection, with a demand to cough, and found that 
“Plaintiff’s own allegations reflect that a reasonable amount of force was used to compel 
cooperation following Plaintiff’s refusals to cooperate.”  (District Court Mar. 9, 2010 Op. 
at 14.)  However, Jordan further alleged that the officers conducting the search also 
kicked him to the floor and vigorously stomped on his upper back.  Jordan argues that 
this force was excessive, among other reasons, because he was already on the floor, 
naked.  The District Court did not discuss Jordan’s allegations of being kicked and 
stepped on during the search, and we will not consider the matter in the first instance on 
appeal. 
 We therefore affirm the District Court as to all claims except for Jordan’s claims 
of an unreasonable search and use of excessive force and will remand for further 
consideration by the District Court. 
                                                 
6
 The District Court also concluded that the false disciplinary report and resulting 
seven-day confinement in lockup also did not state a claim under the Constitution, which 
Jordan does not contest. 
